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Abstract: Inter-organizational relations (IORs), complex constructs existing on 
the verge of companies’ boundaries, are a popular area of managerial and aca-
demic investigation, due to their ability to create sustainable competitive ad-
vantage. The aim of the article is to show applicability, insights and limitations of 
economic perspective in IORs analysis. By reviewing advances of selected econom-
ic and organizational theories exploring IORs, we will try to answer the following 
questions: 
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− Can economic thought add any novelty to IOR analysis in the era of dynamic 
global shifts in competitive environment? Are economic lenses still useful and 
applicable here? 
− Do organizational sciences’ academics take more practical, down to earth 
approach, or have they just moved forward (or blurred the clarity of) their the-
ories by employing advances from social sciences, like sociology and psycholo-
gy? 
− Are these two perspectives contradictory or supplementary?  
The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, we propose an analytical frame-
work to study inter-organizational relations, secondly we analyze the theories 
focused on IORs as results of rational choices; thirdly, we move to theories explor-
ing the reasons why IORs are built in a specific way, and then to concepts looking 
for conditions, methods and key drivers of IORs successful management. In con-
clusion, we give a brief summary of the main findings together with the limitations 
and areas open for further investigation of inter-organizational relations. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Inter-organizational relations (IOR), being ties of different nature, length 
and strength, can be investigated from different points of view depending 
on: their components, structure, power, strength, dynamics or impact they 
have on companies. In order to effectively study, and manage these com-
plex constructs we need to look at relations between enterprises from many 
– economic, sociological, psychological or even anthropological – theoreti-
cal perspectives. In this article, we focus on economic and organizational 
view in IORs analysis and show in what aspects certain economic or organ-
izational theories seem viable. We review some economic disciplines deal-
ing with IORs and juxtapose them with organizational view on inter-
organizational relations, in order to show their insights and consequences of 
using particular theoretical concepts as analytical framework. 
We take different perspectives and use, accordingly, various theoretical 
concepts being a consequence of questions we ask. We can examine the 
grounds of IOR creation, study their shape or structure over time or take 
a closer look at impact they have on entities and environment. The answers 
built here reflect not only theoretical lenses we use, but also result from 
different background (social, economic, cultural) or knowledge and experi-
ence we have acquired. The question is – taking which perspective brings 
the desired outcomes?  
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The theoretical framework we propose in this article (see Figure 1) di-
vides theories dealing with IORs into three main groups: theories that focus 
on IORs as results of rational choices; theories concentrated on the explora-
tion of reasons, why IORs are built in a specific way and concepts looking 
for conditions, methods and key drivers of IORs successful management. 
Using these division criteria we want to show the main focus of a certain 
theory in IORs analysis, but we are fully aware that insights of certain theo-
ries can overlap between sections (as they can both explain why and how 
IORs are shaped, and build some normative propositions how to construct 
effective IORs).  
 
 
Method of the Research  
 
The article presents the results of critical theoretical analysis based on 
a thorough literature review. The authors reviewed the body of literature on 
economic and organizational theories (respectively: new institutional eco-
nomics, resource based view, power – dependence theory and institutional 
analysis of organizations, market power theory, real options theory, contin-
gency view of the firm, strategic management, network analysis).  
 
 
Inter-organizational Relations  
as Consequences of Economic Choice 
 
Economic entities emerge and develop over time with the primary goal to 
maximize their value over time. In the long run, the pursuit to optimize 
activities requires choosing the right activities’ composition in a particular 
environmental set. Transaction cost theory (TCT) examines premises and 
consequences of different governance structures: the firm with its hierarchy 
system; the market with its price mechanism, and hybrid relations, where 
the features of both price mechanism and hierarchy system are mixed 
(Hennart, 1993, pp. 529-548). Pooling (with its intra-firm relations), con-
tracts (governed by market mechanisms) and cooperation (with inter-
organizational relations based on long term loose framework contracts) are 
chosen after transaction cost and value analysis, grounded in the given ex-
ternal conditions (Hennart, 2010, pp. 339-365; Jacobides & Billinger, 2005, 
pp. 249-261; McCarthy & Anagnostou, 2004, pp. 61-71). 
TCT perceives IORs as results of economic calculation and rational 
choice of certain governance models. In a hierarchy, one has to cope with 
the internal coordination problems and provide the set of managing rules 
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minimizing shirking. In a market, when the external transactions prevail, 
relations between the partners are highly formalised by contract rules and 
reflect market conditions. When calculations opt for hybrid solutions, then 
relations between the partners are determined by a relatively loose set of 
mutual obligations, accompanied by a mixture of managing and coordinat-
ing tools. As TCT assumes bounded rationality and opportunism of hu-
mans, IORs may be subject of cheating, unethical behaviour and mislead-
ing judgement accompanied by information scarcity or its misinterpreta-
tion. Resulting from certain governance model choice, IOR will be shaped 
accordingly. They will differ in their:  
− length (market type – the shortest, even if repetitive; pooling the long-
est; hybrid solutions – lengthy); 
− strength: from the weakest (external, governed by market and contracts) 
to very strong internal hierarchical ties; the strength of hybrid relations 
is highly dependent on the value created due to these ties, resources en-
gaged, mutual commitment of partners and the length of these relations; 
− shape determined by market, hierarchical order or loose framework 
contracts.  
In market relations, transaction costs will stem from finding partners 
and information about them and a formation and execution of a contract 
with stress on securing parties interests. In hybrid (co-operation) relations, 
transaction costs will raise due to difficulties in acquiring information about 
co-operation partner, costs related to performance and management of the 
cooperation subject and cooperative relations (e.g. monitoring, organisa-
tion, controlling) and possible difficulties of contract execution (due to its 
loose framework but complex character). In hierarchy/ pooling transactions 
the main burden of costs will be associated with internal management.  
While TCT gives explanation why particular relations evolve within and 
between economic entities and what kind of costs and risks they carry, it 
does not bring clear answers how they should be shaped/managed in order 
to use them as a source of long-term competitive advantage. IORs are per-
ceived here as the outcomes of certain economic decisions aiming at long-
term value maximization, but not as the causes and sources that can raise 
this value over time. Another big drawback of TCT body of literature, yet 
being diminished recently, is too shallow reflection over an institutional 
impact on economic performance of enterprises (and thus on IOR's shape, 
strength and influences). Paradoxically, TCT is a part of the new institu-
tional economics, which analyses institutions and their impact on economic 
behaviour, and when supported by institutional theorists’ reflections, it 
gains a lot in explanatory value.  
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Similarly to TCT, IORs are perceived as outcomes of external factors in the 
market power theory. Co-operation is treated here as the alternative form of 
co-ordination and composition of company’s value chain, chosen as the 
best result of costs and environmental factors’ analysis. What differentiates 
these two perspectives is the stress on possible gains and costs of co-
operation or coalitions. Co-operation allows for risk reduction, economies 
of scale or pooling and sale of knowledge, competences that are created and 
internalised in IORs. The costs of co-operation include coordination and 
mutual adjustment of the partners, risk of cheating, information, knowledge 
outflow, or even conversion of competitive power between the partners. 
The shape, nature and management of IOR in this stream is also (like in 
TCT) somewhat neglected; they are necessary to build effective co-
ordination structures, they can be either offensive or defensive, aiming at 
mutual learning or piggy-backing, but the way they are built and developed 
in order to support, enhance or ruin certain co-ordination structures remains 
a black box here.  
Game theory describes economic actors' behaviour patterns in social sit-
uations (called games here) involving two or more entities, having different 
goals but interdependent or interconnected interests. Cooperative relations 
are treated as an outcome of players' behavioural optimal choices between 
competition and cooperation. Companies compare the consequences of 
cooperative and competitive behaviour to create successful strategies based 
on a chosen dominant approach or flexible coupling of cooperation in one 
sphere with competition in another (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). 
Real options theory (used in strategic management), concentrates on ex-
plaining why a company should (or should not) make certain investments in 
developing assets due to planned growth. Companies should create their 
future potential accordingly to changes in their market situations and bun-
dle of information they have. Both organizational structure and assets struc-
ture of a company should be flexible to meet challenges occurring in turbu-
lent and hardly predictable environment. Real option is an investment in 
existing assets that give firm's managers discretion to decide about their 
exploitation in order to achieve firm’s goals and profits. Internal (hierar-
chical) and external (market and hybrid) growth methods are treated as 
alternative investments of different risk to profit ratio. Rational choices 
between options, (e.g. to invest in building new own factory or to co-
produce new product with a partner and invest in mutual process integra-
tion) decide about preferred ways to grow in certain market conditions. 
Involvement in inter-organizational relations is seen as a kind of invest-
ment, giving company a chance to increase its profits and market value. 
Some authors point out that real options theorizing is somewhat cynical 
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treating partnerships more like cheaper and less risky way to gain firms 
goals, while e.g. traditional cooperation theory concentrates on positive 
thinking and states that cooperation is a strategy regarding mutual com-
mitment, bringing profits for all involved partners (Faulkner & de Rond, 
2005, p. 17). 
 
 
Inter-organisational Relations as a Result  
and Reflection of Environmental Conditions 
 
When we divert our interest from the question why certain types of intra- 
and inter-organizational relations arise and develop, into examining what 
influences their content, durability or effectiveness, TCT, real options’ or 
market power theory do not offer a comprehensive answer, (even though 
we can learn some of their traits like length, type of costs involved, market 
conditions which give impulse to their rise and development). We can learn 
a lot more of their shape and nature from power – dependence theory or 
contingency approach to study organizations, as they take into account the 
social component of IOR, lying either in the composition of environment or 
depending on certain resources of entities entering into a certain relation.  
To start with, we will examine institutional approach to studying IORs 
and define institutions (after D. North) as formal rules, informal compul-
sions and ways to impose and enforce them (North, 1986, p. 231), but they 
are also called “hardened preferences” (Riker, 1980, pp. 432-446), “rules, 
procedures and arrangements” (Shepsle, 1989, pp. 131-147), or “principles 
which define how one should act and what is forbidden” (Ostrom 1986, pp. 
3-25). According to the new institutionalists of the organizational theory, 
institutions are macroabstracts of rationalized and depersonalised recom-
mendations (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 15) and they originate from 
certain scripts of behaviour, categorizations or rules, not necessarily ration-
al but becoming ingrained, and then institutionalised when repeated without 
any reflection.  
Despite the differences, all definitions emphasize a significant impact of 
institutions on economic performance. Institutions (both external and inter-
nal, within the organization) create a tunnel which restricts full rationality 
of economic actors (Simon, 1987; Stępień & Szarzec, 2007), influence their 
performance together with shaping IORs and any outcomes of economic 
actions.  
Despite the agreement about the impact of institutions on economic per-
formance, there are big differences among institutional theoretical frac-
tions, concerning the question how strong this impact is. For example, ac-
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cording to TCT and the theory of public choice, institutions originate from 
logical reasoning aiming at optimization, so economic performance influ-
enced by institutions can diversify the strategy the goals are achieved with, 
but will not disrupt its economic logic. Quite different is the approach of 
economic historians to this interplay between institutions and economic 
performance. Institutions, being socially embedded and therefore persis-
tently lengthy, deteriorate in time; the quicker and more drastically, the 
more turbulent environment is. Due to social embeddedness, legacy and 
change persistence, economic effectiveness of institutions remains ques-
tionable, thus they can blur or mislead economic performance and out-
comes.  
This difference in the nature of institutions (rational or social, cultural, 
historic) and its impact on economic performance is also reflected in the 
way IOR are perceived and analysed.  
In the public choice theory inter-organizational relations result either 
from obedience or legal (or illegal) avoidance of existing constraints, but 
economic actors are self–determined and can efficiently cope with these 
restrictions. To juxtapose, the institutional organisational perspective shows 
an economic actor as a passive individual entangled and bound by envi-
ronmental regulations, striving for legitimization in its desire to adapt to 
external rules (Lotia & Hardy, 2008, p. 370). Adhering to routines, dupli-
cating patterns or favouring institutionalization often leads to structural 
inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, pp. 149-164; Podolny & Stuart, 1995, 
pp. 1224-1260), as changes in performance (and in IOR) occur rarely and 
are rather creep than step. Revolutionary, fundamental changes in economic 
performance (and IOR) are possible, but only as a response to major revo-
lution or institutional breakdown (Stępień, 2001, pp. 53-71). 
The perception of IORs depends also on the type of institutions we ana-
lyze. New institutional economists concentrate mostly on formal institu-
tions (e.g. regulations concerning the freedom to conduct economic activi-
ty, tax systems); their content, stability, executing power and overall ability 
to lower transaction costs (North, 1992, pp. 477-478). The more stable the 
institutional framework, the stronger the social confidence in the state and 
in business partners, the more efficient and lasting IOR can be: they em-
body social trust, bear less informational misinterpretation or shirking and 
allow co-operation partners for innovative business development.  
By comparison, researchers developing the new institutionalism in the 
organisation theory put emphasis on informal institutions and their impact 
on IORs structure and dynamics. Only these formal institutions that origi-
nate from informal set of rules, reinforce social approval and stability 
(Grannovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Rooks et. al. 
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2000). Building effective and long lasting IOR requires convergence of 
both formal and informal institutions, which stem from social trust and are 
strengthened by political stability and transparency. Social capital can then 
be developed in order to minimize transactions costs and temptations to 
behave in opportunistic manner (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Gulati 
& Singh, 1998). 
To sum up, institutional analysis offers better understanding how the 
outside rules of game shape the content, length and effectiveness of IORs, 
but can be hammered as environmental determinism. In order to balance 
the critics of this perspective, the resource dependence theory can be ana-
lysed, as internal perception of environmental pressures and its conse-
quences on IORs.  
Resource dependence theory views IORs as organisation's reaction to ei-
ther internal or environmental pressures, caused by power imbalance (Pfef-
fer & Salancik, 2003). The power itself is generated from three main ana-
lytic sources: resources, regulations and networks (Knoke & Chen, 2009, p. 
443). Environmental forces (like state imposition of certain acts, powerful 
stakeholders, competitors’ networks etc.) may limit organisation's autono-
my and profitability and exert their power on organisations internal pro-
cesses. IORs are responses to power-related problems, built to modify 
power relationships between organisation and external forces (Huxham & 
Beech, 2009, pp. 556-557). They are means to gain power and are them-
selves resources that combine both material and social capital in a certain 
(most desirably – optimal) way, substantiated in internal and external rou-
tines. The forms and dynamics of IORs, mutual interdependencies of part-
ners, are analysed in power-dependency theory, but the main focus is put 
on IORs ability to neutralize environmental constraints (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005, pp. 167-199). This ability derives from resources (pos-
sessed or controlled by an organization), obtained through investment, self-
development or participation in IORs (Pfeffer, 1992; Knoke & Chen, 2009, 
pp. 446). The value and competitive power of a resource rises with its: abil-
ity to reduce costs and differentiate the portfolio of a company; uniqueness 
(measured by rarity and external demand) and the difficulty to be duplicat-
ed by competitors (Godfrey & Hill, 1995, p. 520). The value of IORs (as 
co-opetitive forms of organisation), is relative and different for each part-
ner, since it depends on the partner's ability to effectively utilise IOR as 
a strategic tool (Sulimowska-Formowicz & Stępień, 2014).  
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To summarise, power – dependency theory perceives economic entities 
as open systems exchanging resources and building external ties that shape 
their competitive power through:  
− creating and managing valuable relational competences that shape out-
standing IORs – the source of power comes from the ownership of 
knowledge and the competence to build and manage such IORs,  
− controlling IORs – the source of power comes from the ability to control 
relations, which were not necessarily created by a given entity,  
− having formal authorisation to create the rules of the game within cer-
tain environment, and therefore the power to create favourable IORs,  
− having informal authorisation to create both the rules of the game and 
IORs.  
From the point of view of contingency theory, IORs may be seen as al-
ternative structures of firm's activities in a given context. Structural contin-
gency means that organization has a plan how to organize its internal value 
chain and its external connections in order to assure the best fit and adapta-
bility to changes necessary for successful operation in a specific business 
environment. Structural contingency is affected by a set of external and 
internal determinants – contingency factors. Organizations as open systems 
interact with environment and adapt to its circumstances by choosing the 
best structure to both fit to outside conditions and satisfy own needs. Stra-
tegic, structural, technological, managerial and cultural fit (both external 
and internal) is a key success factor explored in this field and further devel-
oped in organizational development theory.  
 
 
IOR as Manageable Capital and a Source  
of Competitive Advantage 
 
Power – resource dependence or contingency theories show IORs as a spe-
cial kind of resources and ties, whose value depends on an environmental 
fit and a set of relative competences of the company. The latter directs our 
attention to the inside of the organization and provokes the question about 
the ability and limits of successful management of internal resources.  
Business cooperation allows independent organizations to achieve mu-
tual benefits by: resource connection and exchanging, distribution and co-
creation of products, services, procedures and organizational processes 
(Serrat, 2009). Engagement in cooperation is also considered to be a ‘hard 
times strategy’; the answer for increasing market uncertainty by reliance on 
trustworthy external partners (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). When we take 
the managerial perspective to studying IORs, using advances of resource 
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based view theory, strategic management or relational theories is both 
promising and useful here, as these fields have been developed on the 
foundation of human ability to actively and successfully manage internal 
resources in order to achieve the desired goals. 
Strategic management theories, perceiving IORs as alternative ways of 
companies’ development (compared with usage of internal resources or 
market transactions) explore motives for IORs creation, problems with 
choosing cooperation partners, but focus mainly on creation and develop-
ment of competitive cooperation structures (Faulkner & de Rond, 2005, pp. 
4-16). IORs, perceived as a potential source of competitive advantage, can 
be then effectively managed by partners through creating common govern-
ance modes and conditions for learning, both inter-partner and by compa-
nies themselves in order to gain individual advantages from the partnership.  
Efficient long-term inter–organisational relations should positively af-
fect not only the profitability of partners, but also the quality of their com-
petitive power by improvement in products, technological chains or by 
increasing partners’ knowledge, competences related to the subject of co-
operation and skills necessary for establishing, maintaining, and developing 
long-term business relations (Hansen & Schaumburg-Mueller, 2006, p. 12). 
Cooperation effectiveness and efficiency is influenced by factors coming 
from the environment – partners’ home markets and the arena of partner-
ship, related to transaction attributes (information asymmetry, asset speci-
ficity and differences in bargaining power) as well as connected with firms' 
characteristics (cooperative capabilities and trustworthiness). By managing 
these factors (some of them remain beyond firm’s control), cooperation 
partners try to reach their business goals, which means they try to maximize 
the gain from the relationship and minimize its cost. The latter means ef-
forts made in order to balance formal and informal governance methods 
preventing opportunistic behaviour (Hansen et. al., 2008).  
Resource-based view concentrates on factors determining the success of 
cooperation strategies. The assumption is that cooperation can create such 
competitive advantage for partners that could not be achieved independent-
ly (due to bigger costs or longer time required) (Madhkok, 2005, p. 77). 
IORs are means to get the access to partners’ resources, internalize them 
and build the competitive advantage out of it. In order to make IORs lasting 
and effective, partners have to build mechanisms that secure their interests 
and allow to manage relations smoothly and effectively by creating synergy 
effects. Within the organizations, soft, dynamic, systemic and multi-
structured relational competences (reflected in social capital and organiza-
tional knowledge) have to be built in order to create, monitor, develop, 
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sustain, and cease cooperation together with enhancing the possibility to 
absorb external knowledge, competences, information etc. 
Contrary to RBV, a relational view assumes that the main sources of 
competitive advantage are not the resources acquired through cooperation, 
but IORs themselves (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Smith 
et. al, 1995; Lavie 2006). Relations, networks are valuable resources (as 
potential sources of sustainable competitive advantage), as they embody 
social capital, relational competences and condition the absorption of in-
formation and knowledge.  
Network approach, adopting this view, builds on practically all the 
abovementioned theoretical findings, although it is not a cohesive set of 
theoretical streams (Hakansson & Snehota 1995; Ford & Hakansson, 2002). 
Depending on the paradigm, studying IORs can be driven by: rational 
choices reflected in an economic stream of thought (they result from trans-
action costs or power imbalances); organizational outcomes (and then IORs 
stem from structures and procedures inside companies but transformed by 
environmental pressures) or individual traits of actors involved in the co-
operation (due to their genes, experience etc.). The focus is put on detailed 
descriptions of network and relations content and types, partner selection 
topics and endogenous network-based processes: why do organizations 
choose each other to be partners?, whom do they choose?, for what pur-
pose?, what are mechanisms structuring relation – social ties type?, what 
trust-building mechanisms are used?, how do corporate practices diffuse in 
networks?, how do governance structures change?, what is the route of 
organizational forms adoption among partners? (Lomi et. al., 2009, pp. 
322-323). Even though very popular today, with many plots developed 
here, no consistent theoretical set of rules has emerged clearly yet.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Both economic and organizational perspectives are vital not only to under-
standing, but also to effective IORs managing in order to convert them into 
sources of sustainable competitive advantages and fibre for companies’ 
value maximization. In Table 1 we summarize the above review of selected 
economic and organizational perspectives on IORs analysis, together with 
shedding some light on their usefulness and areas that require further inves-
tigation. 
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 Despite some areas where economic and organizational approaches are 
contradictory (in the perception of the level of bounded rationality of eco-
nomic entities, the strength of institutional impact, the source of competi-
tive power IORs possess and carry) they supplement and enrich the rela-
tional analysis by stressing different aspects of IORs’ creation, dynamics 
and performance. Economic thought, although not answering in detail how 
IORs should be shaped and managed in the era of global environmental 
turbulence, has built unquestionably useful grounds for determining opti-
mal structure and governance mode of intra- and inter-organizational rela-
tions, and highlights their environmental dependence (arising either from 
institutional impact or power imbalances) and embeddedness in company’s 
structure, knowledge and social capital.  
Academics representing organizational sciences do not always take 
practical, managerial approach (even though they heavily rely on and em-
ploy social sciences advances in their IORs research), as some concepts 
perceive organizations as entangled with environmental constraints, or dis-
empowered by internal structural inertia.  
Each of the theories reviewed here shows certain limitations (especially 
in the light of efficient IOR management) and by doing so, defines its 
boundaries. In order to push these boundaries forward and increase the 
probability of successful IOR management, it is vital to look on relations 
between enterprises from many theoretical perspectives, as each theory 
focuses usually on one or few different aspects while overshadowing re-
maining areas. IOR are complex artefacts and cannot be sufficiently ex-
plained only by one, no matter how well developed theory. By the same 
token successful IOR management requires tools that are built with careful 
usage of economic, sociological, psychological and anthropological theo-
retic achievements. We also have to remember that persistence and devel-
opment of inter-organisational relations blurs the boundaries of organisa-
tions involved in such interplay, but it does not necessarily make the IOR 
management more difficult. Acquiring experience and building trust, to-
gether with learning various types of relational boundaries (like economic, 
political, functional, time related, cultural constraints etc.) (Williams, 2006) 
makes IOR management easier, despite the fact that the action takes place 
on the verge of control.  
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